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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jamie Lee Nelson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding her guilty of possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. Specifically, Nelson 
appeals the district court's denial of her motion to suppress statements she made 
to law enforcement officers during a parole compliance search of her residence 
done in regard to her husband's parole. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 31, 2012, Idaho Department of Correction Probation and Parole 
officers and Garden City Police officers went to the residence of parolee Adam 
Nelson to conduct a parole compliance search. (9/4/12 Tr., p.31, L.3 - p.32, 
L.11.) When Parole Officer Colson entered the residence, Nelson was already 
sitting in the living room, and after Colson asked them to be seated, Adam 
Nelson sat down in the living room too. (9/4/12 Tr., p.35, L.20 - p.36, L.12.) Six 
officers initially entered the residence to assist in conducting the parole search. 
(9/4/12 Tr., p.37, Ls.6-12; p.41, L.17- p.42, L.20.) Two of the officers left the 
house after about ten minutes, and Officer Colson and Garden City Police Officer 
Lythgoe went into the bathroom of the master bedroom where they found 
methamphetamine inside a velvet Crown Royal bag and a "sippy cup" that 
"appeared to be something used to smoke methamphetamine" under the sink. 
(9/4/12 Tr., p.37, L.6 - p.39, L.3; p.50, Ls.4-15.) 
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Officer Colson went back into the living room and arrested Adam Nelson 
on an agent's warrant and then asked Nelson when she had last used 
methamphetamine, and Nelson "stated that morning." (9/4/12 Tr., p.38, L.3 -
p.40, L.9; p.51, Ls.13-18.) Officer Lythgoe spoke with Nelson in the living room 
for about a minute, and asked her whether she was on probation and if she 
would "piss hot," meaning test positive on a urinalysis, and Nelson answered 
"yes," she was on misdemeanor probation and "she would piss hot." (9/4/12 Tr., 
p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.15; p.61, Ls.22-24.) 
Although the officers who entered Nelson's residence were armed, they 
did not draw their weapons or make any threats to Nelson. (9/4/12 Tr., p.45, 
Ls.13-20; p.61, Ls.17-21; p.74, Ls.4-8.) Prior to being questioned by Officers 
Colson and Lythgoe, Nelson was not placed in handcuffs, and she was permitted 
to leave the living room accompanied by an officer to get her baby and have the 
child remain with her and her husband in the living room during the house 
search. (9/4/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.7-11; p.48, Ls.6-12; p.59, Ls.11-15.) 
After Nelson's husband was placed under arrest in the living room, he 
apologized to Nelson, and she responded saying "I'd been clean for five years. I 
told you when you brought this stuff here this would happen." (9/4/12 Tr., p.39, 
L.7 - p.40, L.2.) Garden City Police Detective Thorndyke, who arrived at the 
residence after the search began, found more methamphetamine in a jewelry box 
drawer by the bed in the master bedroom. (9/4/12 Tr., p.43, L.14 - p.44, L.4; 
p.69, L.19 - p.73, L.9.) 
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Nelson was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), injury to child (misdemeanor), and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.34-35.) Nelson, through counsel, filed a motion to 
suppress statements she made to Officers Colson and Lythgoe during the parole 
compliance search of her residence, claiming they were obtained in violation of 
Miranda1 because she was "in custody" at the time. (R., pp.67-68, 71-72.) 
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court verbally denied Nelson's 
motion to suppress her statements. (9/4/12 Tr., p.89, L.17 - p.93, L.24.) Nelson 
proceeded to trial and was convicted of possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia, but was acquitted of 
injury to child (misdemeanor). (R., p.241; Vol. II Trial Tr., p.457, Ls.1-18.) 
Nelson was sentenced to two years fixed followed by an indeterminate five-year 
term, for a unified sentence of seven years. (R., pp.289-292; 11/14/12 Sent. Hrg. 
Tr., p.32, Ls.3-9.) The district court retained jurisdiction over Nelson for up to 
one year. (Id.) Nelson was further ordered by the court to pay $2,535 for the 
costs of prosecution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k). (R., p.290.) Nelson filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.294-297.) 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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ISSUES 
Nelson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Nelson's motion 
to suppress statements made in response to questioning by 
law enforcement officers while she was detained during a 
parole search of her house? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. 
Nelson to pay restitution for prosecution costs in the 
absence of any, let alone substantial, evidence to support 
such an award? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Nelson failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress? 
2. Should this case be remanded to the district court for further proceedings to 
determine the correct amount to order for the costs of prosecution under I.C. § 
37-2732(k)? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Nelson Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To 
Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Nelson contends "the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
suppress statements made in response to questioning by law enforcement 
officers while she was detained during a parole search of her house because she 
was questioned in circumstances that were the functional equivalent of being in 
custody without having been provided with Miranda warnings." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.4.) 
Contrary to Nelson's claim, application of the law to the facts found by the 
district court shows that she was not in custody to a degree associated with 
formal arrest when either Parole Officer Chris Colson or Garden City Police 
Officer Angela Lythgoe briefly questioned her. Because Nelson was not in 
custody for Miranda purposes, she has failed to show any basis for reversal of 
the district court's order denying her motion to suppress her statements. The 
district court correctly applied the law in denying Nelson's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Like the standard of review applicable to suppression motions, generally, 
the determination of whether police are required to provide Miranda warnings 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 854, 11 
P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate court reviews the trial court's findings 
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of fact for clear error, but gives free review to the application of constitutional 
principles to those facts. & 
C. Legal Standards Relevant For Determining Whether A Defendant Was "In 
Custody" During A Valid Home Search By Police, Thus Necessitating 
Miranda Warnings Before Any Statements Made In Response To Police 
Interrogation Are Admissible 
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 (1966), that before an 
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers must 
advise the individual of certain rights, including the right to remain silent. As 
stated in State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000), "The 
[Supreme] Court, in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 ... (1983), 
explained that "custody" for purposes of the Miranda requirement turns on 
whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest.' This standard is an objective test; 
whether a reasonable person would believe he or she was in police custody to a 
degree associated with formal arrest, not whether the person would believe he or 
she was not free to leave." (Citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 
(1984) (emphasis added)); (compare Appellant's Brief, p.6 (quoting statement in 
United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2002), that "Kim was 'in custody' 
for Miranda purposes because a reasonable person in Kim's circumstances 
would not have felt free to leave."). 
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Because the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom 
associated with formal arrest, a person subject to a routine traffic stop or an 
investigative detention based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
although not "free to leave," is ordinarily not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420; State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981). 
In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005), the Supreme Court reiterated its 
holding in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), "that officers 
executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority 'to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."' Such a 
detention during the execution of a search warrant represents only an 
incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been 
authorized by a valid warrant. 2 Summers, 452 U.S. at 703. Such detentions are 
"surely less intrusive than the search itself' and "substantially less intrusive than 
an arrest." kl at 701-702. Absent extenuating circumstances such as the use of 
2 Law enforcement officers may also detain occupants of premises during a 
parole compliance search without placing the occupants "in custody" for 
purposes of Miranda. Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009) 
("We hold, pursuant to Muehler v. Mena ... that officers may constitutionally 
detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance 
search.") (overruled in part by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 
2012) (overruling Sanchez and other cases "to the extent they hold that 'there is 
no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the 
fourth amendment. ... These cases conflict with the Supreme Court's holding 
that 'parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers.' Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 ... (2006).") 
Inasmuch as the overruling of Sanchez by King does not affect Sanchez's 
holding that officers may constitutionally detain occupants of a home during a 
parole search - vis-a-vis a probation search - the rule set forth in Sanchez 
applies to Nelson because her home was subjected to a parole compliance 
search. 
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handcuffs or force, "a person detained during the execution of a search warrant 
is generally not in custody" for purposes of Miranda." State v. Young, 136 Idaho 
711, 719, 39 P.3d 651, 659 (Ct. App. 2002). This is so despite the fact that 
officers, incident to the detention, necessarily control the person's movements to 
a certain degree. kl at 720-721, 39 P.3d at 660-661. 
"[W]hether a person's detention during the execution of a search warrant 
rises to a degree associated with formal arrest must be determined on a case-by-
case basis." kl at 719, 39 P.3d at 659. Factors to be considered by the court 
include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the 
nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other persons. State 
v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117-118, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367-1368 (Ct. App. 1992). 
It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that she was in custody. State v. 
James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010) ("We join the vast 
majority of courts that have considered the issue and hold that the burden of 
showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a 
failure to administer Miranda warnings."). 
D. The District Court's Reasoned Decision 
The district court denied Nelson's motion to suppress the statements she 
made to Officer Colson and Officer Lythgoe, explaining (with bracketed 
references to the testimonial record): 
As to any statements that were made, the factors that the 
Court has to consider ultimately is [sic] whether it was a formal 
arrest or restrain [sic] on freedom of movement to the degree 
associated with a formal arrest. 
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Under Terry versus ldaho,l31 officers do have the ability to 
detain. The Court finds that this was a detention, not an arrest. To 
that extent, it applies the factors of U.S. versus Hayden_l4l 
In analyzing those factors, Miss Nelson was asked to stay in 
the front room, but she did not object. [9/4/12 Tr., p.33, Ls.6-12; 
p.36, Ls.1-12; p.37, Ls.13-18; p.47, Ls.14-16.] While the defense 
states that the only reason to ask her statements was incrimination, 
that is not the only reason that was present. It was also obvious 
and [sic] safety issues related to the officers, especially with 
movement into the rooms - other rooms within house [sic]. [9/4/12 
Tr., p.36, Ls.3-5.] 
The physical surroundings of the interrogation was [sic] 
obviously in a home, not in a detention center, and not in a police 
car. [9/4/12 Tr., p.39, L.15- p.40, L.9.] 
The duration of the detention was reasonable in that the 
detention -- up until the time of the search -- was an hour, and that 
was at the time of any statements that were made by Officer 
Lythgoe to Miss Nelson. [9/4/12 Tr., p.40, L.20 - p.44, L.13.] 
And the degree of pressure applied to detain Miss Nelson 
was that she was simply asked to stay in the front room. [9/4/12 
Tr., p.47, Ls.14-16.) But beyond that, there was no other pressure 
applied to her detention. [9/4/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.9-20; p.61, Ls.17-21.] 
While [defense counsel] points out that there were six 
officers who were armed, all six officers were not there 
continuously. All six officers were not there continuously with Mrs. 
Nelson. [9/4/12 Tr., p.37, Ls.6-12; p.41, L.17 - p.42, L.20.] In fact, 
most of the officers were actually in the other room and not with 
Mrs. Nelson. [Id.] And while the officers were armed, there's no 
evidence that Mrs. Nelson was aware that they were armed. 
[9/4/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.13-20; p.61, Ls.17-21; p.74, Ls.4-8.] And 
there's no evidence - as a matter of fact, the evidence is that their 
weapons were not drawn, and she was not threatened. [Id.] 
Now, as to the extent to which the defendant was 
confronted, Officer Lythgoe stated that she spoke with Mrs. Nelson 
for only about a minute, and the question was whether she would 
be positive on a urinalysis, but that does not go directly to 
3 The district court was obviously referring to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
4 United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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ownership of the drugs. [9/4/12 Tr., p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.14; p.61, 
Ls.22-24.] The drugs that were in the house, belonged - who 
possessed them, or who they belonged to [sic]. So to that extent, 
the inquiry of Mrs. Nelson was minimal. 
It's obvious before Officer Madden made any statements or 
requested any statements of Mrs. Nelson she was Mirandized, and 
she did not consent. [See 9/4/12 Tr., p.65, Ls.1-24.] So no 
statements past that are at issue as to whether they were 
statements within a custodial interrogation. 
So to that extent, the Court will not suppress any statements 
made by Mrs. Nelson during the course of the interaction with the 
officers. So the motion to suppress the evidence and the motion to 
suppress the statements are denied. 
(9/4/12 Tr., p.91, L.3 - p.93, L.15.) 
The prosecutor asked the district court to clarify whether its ruling applied 
to statements Nelson made to both Officer Colson and Officer Lythgoe, and the 
court responded: 
Yes, because Officer Colson was there during that minute 
that she was questioned by Lythgoe. I believe his question was 
when she had last used methamphetamine. It was intermingled 
with Officer Lythgoe's questions. [9/4/12 Tr., p.38, L.3 - p.40, L.9; 
p.57, L.11 - p.58, L.14.] So to that extent, that statement is also 
not suppressed. 
(9/4/12 Tr., p.93, Ls.18-24.) 
E. Nelson Was Not In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda When The Officers 
Questioned Her 
Nelson contends she was in custody during the police interrogations by 
Officer Lythgoe and Officer Colson because: (1) "six police and probation 
officers, accompanied by a drug dog, entered her home and ordered her to 
remain on her couch[,]" (2) although she was inside her own home, she "was not 
allowed to go to her baby's bedroom without asking permission and being 
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accompanied by an officer[,]" (3) she was interrogated "about her probation 
status and drug use only after discovering drugs and paraphernalia in her home 
and arresting her husband in front of her[,]" and (4) "prior to asking [her] whether 
she would 'piss hot' and when she had last ingested methamphetamine, she was 
asked whether she was on probation[,]" and "[g]iven her affirmative answer, the 
question would have caused a reasonable person to believe that she was 
required to answer questions regarding drug use as a condition of her probation." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Based on those factors, Nelson concludes, "it is 
clear that [she] was subjected to custodial interrogation in the absence of 
Miranda warnings and that her statements must be suppressed." (Id., p.10.) 
For the reasons that follow, Nelson is incorrect. 
The state agrees with Nelson that the officers' questions about when she 
last used methamphetamine and whether she was on probation and would "piss 
hot" constituted interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 
(1980) ("[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
the suspect."). Contrary to Nelson's assertion on appeal, application of the law to 
the facts established at the suppression motion hearing shows that, although she 
was detained, she was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when she was 
interrogated. Consequently, the officers were not required to administer Miranda 
warnings before questioning her. 
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bathroom of the master bedroom where, about 30 minutes after entering the 
house, they found methamphetamine under the sink. (9/4/12 Tr., p.37, L.6 -
p.40, L.23.) 
A few minutes later, Officer Colson went back into the living room and 
arrested Adam Nelson on an agent's warrant and then asked Nelson when she 
had last used methamphetamine. (9/4/12 Tr., p.38, L.3 - p.40, L.9; p.51, Ls.13-
18.) The district court's determination that the "duration of the detention was 
reasonable" because Nelson was detained only one hour5 before she was 
interrogated is well-taken. In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 93-94 (2005), the 
Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough the duration of a detention can affect 
the balance of interests, the 2-to 3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case does 
not outweigh the government's continuing safety interests." Here, Nelson's 
comparatively short one-hour detention (while sitting un-cuffed with her baby and 
husband in her own living room) during the parole search cannot be deemed 
unreasonable in duration. 
Moreover, the interrogations of Nelson were not overbearing. Officer 
Lythgoe spoke with Nelson for only about a minute, and although she asked 
Nelson whether she was on probation and if she would test positive on a 
urinalysis, as the district court determined, the inquiry was minimal because it did 
not "go directly to ownership of the drugs" that were found. (9/4/12 Tr., p.57, 
L.24 - p.58, L.15; p.61, Ls.22-24; p.92, L.20 - p.93, L.4.) Officer Colson only 
5 Officer Colson's testimony seems to indicate that it was only about 33 minutes 
between the officers' entry into Nelson's residence and when Nelson was first 
interrogated. (See 9/4/12 Tr., p.38, L.3- p.41, L.6.) 
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asked Nelson "the last time that she'd used[.]" (9/4/12 Tr., p.40, Ls.6-9.) In sum, 
the officers' questions to Nelson were short and not directly accusatory in regard 
to the methamphetamine found in the residence. 
The district court also correctly held that, although the officers who 
entered Nelson's residence were armed, there was no indication she was made 
aware of that fact, or that any of the officers displayed their weapons or 
threatened her in any manner. (9/4/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.13-20; p.61, Ls.17-21; p.74, 
Ls.4-8.) Prior to being questioned by Officers Colson and Lythgoe, Nelson was 
not placed in handcuffs, and she was permitted to leave the living room 
accompanied by an officer to get her baby and have the child remain with her 
and her husband in the living room during the house search. (9/4/12 Tr., p.41, 
Ls.7-11; p.48, Ls.6-12; p.59, Ls.11-15.) The district court also correctly 
concluded that the degree of pressure applied to detain Nelson was that "she 
was simply asked to stay in the front room[,] ... [b]ut beyond that, there was no 
other pressure applied to her detention." (9/4/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.9-20; p.47, Ls.14-
16; p.61, Ls.17-21; p.92, Ls.5-8.) 
The foregoing facts establish that Nelson was not in custody during the 
execution of the parole compliance search of her home. Here, as in Young, 136 
Idaho 711, 39 P.3d 651, at 720, 39 P.3d at 660, officers did not draw weapons, 
use force, threats, or handcuffs, and although the defendant was ordered by 
police to remain in one place during the search of the residence, she was not in 
custody for purposes of Miranda. As noted in Young, conversely, in Moss v. 
State, 823 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), the defendant was "in custody" 
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when officers in raid gear entered his residence with weapons drawn and took 
him into a back bedroom, closed the door and questioned him about drug 
trafficking; after cocaine was found, he was again taken into bedroom where he 
finally admitted to possessing cocaine. Young, 136 Idaho at 720, 39 P.3d at 660 
(also comparing Proferes v. State, 13 P.3d 955 (Nev. 2000) (defendant deemed 
"in custody" after he knocked on the door of a house being searched pursuant to 
a warrant and was tackled and handcuffed when he tried to run away). 
Although the measures the officers took had the effect of restricting 
Nelson's movement to a certain degree, the restriction was minimal and nowhere 
close to where a reasonable person in Nelson's position would believe she was 
in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest. Nelson failed to meet 
her burden in the district court of establishing that she was in custody for 
purposes of Miranda. Having failed to show that she was subject to custodial 
interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, Nelson has failed to show 
any basis for reversal of the district court's order denying her motion to suppress 
her statements to Officers Colson and Lythgoe. 
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11. 
This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court For Further Proceedings 
To Determine The Correct Amount To Order For The Costs Of Prosecution 
Under I.C. § 37-2732(k) 
The state does not challenge Nelson's contention that the $2,535 amount 
of restitution Nelson was ordered to pay restitution for the costs of prosecution 
pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k)6 was not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. However, the proper remedy for the error is to vacate the judgment of 
conviction as to that provision and remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings to determine, through the submission of evidence, the correct 
amount to award for such costs. 
It is appropriate for an appellate court to modify a restitution award where 
"the proper amount of restitution can be determined from the record," but a 
remand for further proceedings is appropriate where this is not possible. Garza 
v. State, 841 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tx. App. 1992). In State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 
259, 233 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a 
situation where the state represented at the sentencing hearing that no restitution 
hearing was necessary because it had already established the amount of 
restitution through trial testimony, and held that the amount of restitution awarded 
was not supported with substantial evidence. The court of appeals remanded for 
a restitution hearing, explaining: 
6 I.C. § 37-2732(k) allows the state to recover "restitution for costs incurred by 
law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation." I.C. § 37-2732(k). 
"Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of 
evidence, travel and per diem ... , and any other investigative or prosecution 
expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees." Id. 
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During Johnson's sentencing hearing the prosecutor initially asked 
for additional time to present a restitution request. Defense counsel 
also requested additional time and requested a restitution hearing. 
The prosecutor then disagreed, arguing that no hearing was 
needed because the State had already established the value of the 
copper wire at trial as the replacement value and that Johnson only 
wished to relitigate that already-established figure. Ultimately, the 
district court determined that it had already heard enough valuation 
evidence and ordered restitution in the amount of $2,000 without 
further evidence from Johnson or the prosecutor concerning UPR's 
economic loss. 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes the court in criminal 
cases to order the payment of restitution to the crime victim if the 
crime resulted in an economic loss to the victim .... The court is 
directed to determine the amount of economic loss based upon the 
preponderance of the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, 
defendant, victim, or presentence investigator. I.C. § 19-5304(6); 
Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280. "Each party shall have 
the right to present such evidence as may be relevant to the issue 
of restitution .... " I. C. § 19-5304(6). Determination of the amount 
of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court, whose findings 
will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. 
Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280 (quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938,943,935 P.2d 201,206 (Ct. App.1997)). 
Because we have held above that the State did not present 
substantial evidence of the value of the stolen copper wire at 
Johnson's trial, we hold that the district court erred in awarding 
restitution of $2,000 based solely on that same evidence. On 
remand, the district court should conduct new proceedings to 
determine appropriate restitution. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho at 267, 233 P .3d at 198 ( emphasis added). 
At Nelson's sentencing hearing, the deputy prosecutor verbally requested 
restitution for $4,746 in prosecution costs based on 39 hours of work done on 
Nelson's case "from the time the case hit district court." (11/14/12 Sent. Hrg. Tr., 
p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.13.) Nelson's counsel asked the court, in the event it was 
"inclined" to grant the state's request, "to not enter an order today on the 
restitution but require the state to provide further documentation on it." (11/14/12 
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Sent. Hrg. Tr., p.23, Ls.20-23.) As in Johnson, Nelson's defense counsel did not 
agree with the restitution amount requested at the sentencing hearing and 
requested the state to provide further documentation.7 Also, the prosecutors in 
both cases were satisfied with the documentation ( or evidence) they had 
provided the court by the time of the sentencing hearings. Nonetheless, in 
Johnson, the court of appeals remanded the case for a restitution hearing, giving 
the state an opportunity to present evidence to support its restitution request. 
This Court should do likewise. 
Here, the district court awarded restitution for $2,535 in prosecution costs 
based on its own determination that the "loaded benefit rate of an Ada County 
prosecuting attorney would come at about $65 an hour[.]" (11/14/12 Sent. Hrg. 
Tr., p.32, Ls.12-23.) The court explained, "without seeing that actual figure, I do 
find that that's a reasonable cost related to prosecution[.]" (11/14/12 Sent. Hrg. 
Tr., p.32, Ls.18-23.) Although such an award without substantial evidence to 
support it is not proper, $0 is not a proper award either. Therefore, as in 
Johnson, the better remedy is to remand for further proceedings to determine, 
through the submission of evidence, the actual amount of restitution for the costs 
of prosecution. 
In sum, the state does not dispute that there was not substantial evidence 
to support the $2,535 amount awarded under I.C. § 37-2732(k) for the costs of 
prosecution in this case. The proper remedy, however, is to remand to the 
7 In Johnson, defense counsel requested a restitution hearing be set, which is 
tantamount to demanding that the state support its restitution request with 
"further documentation." 
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district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the correct amount of 
such an award. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Nelson's conviction by 
affirming the district court's order denying Nelson's motion to suppress, and 
remand to the district court for the limited purpose of determining, through an 
evidentiary hearing, the amount of restitution that should be awarded for the 
costs of prosecution pursuant to l.C. § 37-2732(k). 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2013. 
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